THE

CASE

OF THE

British Troops serving in Germany.

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British Troops ſerving in Germany.

HUMBLY SUBMITTED TO THE

CONSIDERATION of PARLIAMENT.

WITH

Occaſional REMARKS on the Fallacy of the French HISTORICAL MEMORIAL.

Hi Manus, ob Patriam pugnando, Vulnera paſſi?

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Britiſh Troops in Germany.

THOUGH the manner of the following addreſs may not convey to the public an advantageous prepoſſeſſion in behalf of the author's modeſty, yet the ſubject of it can create no unfavourable idea of his humanity. If the wiſdom and compaſſion of the legiſlature, equally co-operating, intereſted it in the relief of inſolvents doomed to impriſonment for debt, how much ſtronger does the caſe of our brave countrymen abroad in Germany, conſigned to the moſt uncomfortable of all fates, plead for the attention and com-

miſeration of the ſame auguſt body? Every Engliſhman capitally tried has his country for his jury; but in the caſe I now lay before the public, that jury, without the intervention of the legiſlature, can do little more than recommend the unhappy priſoners, (for ſo in the preſent ſtate I muſt deem our army in Germany,) to the mercy of death.

The reader is not here to imagine that I plead for the rich and opulent part of our army abroad. Too many, alas! in the ſame circumſtances at home, confine their notions of want or miſery only to what they themſelves feel, or would feel, were they now ſerving in Weſtphalia; they never ſuffer their ideas to ſtoop to the caſe of the needy ſubaltern, or the diſtreſſed ſoldier. This inattention, this confinement of ſentiment, has drawn upon the public the preſent addreſs, in which the author will endeavour to prove the following propoſitions:

Firſt, That our ſending an army to Germany is no other than a ſecondary meaſure, ſubordinate, or which ought to have been ſubordinate, to the great cauſe of quarrel between France and Britain.

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Secondly, That when Great Britain had ſecured the main object ſhe had in view, in making war, her intereſt led her to have recalled her troops from the continent.

Thirdly, That ſhe might have done that, and yet have adhered ſtrictly to her engagements with her allies in Germany, and have been enabled to have ſerved them more effectually than ſhe has done by the uſeleſs reſidence of her troops in that uncomfortable country for theſe twenty months paſt.

Fourthly, That Great-Britain has now no object of ſufficient importance to detain her troops in Germany.

In diſcuſſing the firſt of theſe propoſitions, it is fair and reaſonable to aſk my reader, whether, though an angel had come down from heaven to perſuade him, he could have believed that the late miniſter and his friends could have come into poſts and power upon the anti-continental principles they adopted, and yet have been able to have carried the continental ſyſtem to a height never known in this country, not even during its moſt violent attachments to ſuch connections? I ſhall readily admit that France did in a

moſt ſcandalous manner hook into her quarrel with Great Britain, his majeſty's electoral dominions in Germany. But ſorry I am to ſay it, that our miniſtry, for theſe three or four years paſt, has connected together two conſiderations that in themſelves are totally diſtinct, and ought to have no manner of reference the one to the other; and what is ſtill more aggravating, this unnatural conjunction was firſt ſuggeſted by France herſelf.

The conſiderations I ſpeak of are Great-Britain and Hanover, which France from the very beginning of the war, to the publication of her late famous hiſtorical memorial, has ever affected to blend, or more properly ſpeaking, to confound together. Had our miniſtry treated thoſe conſiderations as quite independent of each other, the public could not have ſuffered itſelf to have been led ſtep by ſtep to the ruinous connections it is now involved in, without the ſmalleſt emolument to ourſelves, and without offering the leaſt relief to our allies. The manifeſto publiſhed by authority at Paris, in the year 1758, goes entirely upon the plan that France was juſtified in attacking the electoral dominions of Hanover, becauſe they belonged to the king of Great Britain; and the hiſtorical

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memorial publiſhed by the ſame authority, in October 1761, proceeds upon the very ſame ſuppoſition. I ſhall not ſay whether it is the happineſs or the misfortune of Great-Britain that foreigners, even the ableſt and moſt learned, have a very incompetent knowledge of her conſtitution. Monteſquieu, with all his penetration, and the advantage of a long reſidence in England, never could diveſt himſelf of the Frenchman's habit of thinking; and all the precautions which our anceſtors took, by the act of ſucceſſion, to ſeparate the intereſts of Hanover from thoſe of Great-Britain, have not to this day been able to impreſs a ſingle foreigner with an idea that our conſtitution has rendered them diſtinct, and in ſome meaſure incompatible, intereſts.

Would to God that this miſtake had been confined to foreigners, and that our miniſters had not found it too eaſy to propagate the ſame at home! The generous concern which the Engliſh nation takes in every relation ſhe bears towards other powers, eſpecially to a people who have but one common ſovereign with themſelves, is extremely favourable to this illuſion; and while it had not the fatal conſequences that attend it now, there was

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not a man in England (one excepted,) malevolent enough to find fault with the aſſiſtance we gave to our friends in Germany, till at laſt our ideas united their caſe with our own, without recurring to a ſingle principle of the conſtitution. When a meſſage was preſented by the miniſter, as many were, to enable his majeſty to fulfil his continental engagements, the money granted was always, by the good-natured public, conſidered as granted for Britiſh purpoſes, and in a Britiſh quarrel; and our miniſters were too polite to awaken us from that deluſive dream. They were favoured by the injuſtice of France. She wanted to impoſe a diſagreable neutrality upon his late majeſty, as elector of Hanover, which he magnanimouſly rejected; and England was thereby fired with ſo ſtrong a reſentment of the injury offered to her ſovereign, that it ſeemed to require rather the curb than the ſpur of the miniſtry to direct it. The demanding a free paſſage for the French armies through the Hanoverian dominions, and the poſſeſſion of Hamelen as a cautionary town, with many other tame compliances required by France, were inſults too ſhocking for Engliſhmen to endure with patience; and their generous diſ-

dain more than anſwered the miniſter's purpoſes; becauſe it in a manner drove him from the principles of anti-continentaliſm, on which his power was founded.

As if every circumſtance had contributed to ruin the anti-continental ſyſtem, the accidents, for I can call them no other, that preceded the acceſſion of the late miniſter to power, were the moſt favourable for his views that we can well imagine; and he improved them to the utmoſt. The invaſion of Minorca; the diſgrace of the Britiſh fleet in the Mediterranean, under admiral Byng; the loſs of Fort St. Philip; the defeat of general Braddock; and all the other diſtreſſes and diſgraces we underwent in North America, were aſcribed to the miſmanagement of our miniſtry at home; and though the clamour had not the leaſt ſhadow of juſtice to ſupport it, the government was thereby unhinged. From that time our continental engagements took place. When the French threatened to invade Hanover, no tongue moved, no pen was drawn in England againſt the duke of Cumberland putting himſelf at the head of an army of obſervation, though it was eaſily foreſeen that a great part, to the amount of two hundred thouſand pounds of the expence of that army

my was to be defrayed by Great-Britain. Here however a ſcene opened, which proved to all Europe, that we were a thouſand times more ſolicitous about the fate of Hanover than the Hanoverians themſelves were.

The public perhaps has no occaſion to be put in mind, that the battle of Haſtenbeck, which was fought by his Royal Highneſs in July 1757, was chiefly unfortunate, through the untowardly ſituation the king of Pruſſia was then in, by loſing the battle of Colin in the preceding month; and that his Royal Highneſs exerted againſt ſuperior numbers military abilities that would have done honour to the greateſt name in war. His army, through the excellent diſpoſitions he made, had been but very little impaired; and the electorate of Hanover itſelf, at that time, contained within it above one hundred and fifty thouſand fighting men. Such was the ſituation of that electorate, when one of the braveſt and moſt enterpriſing princes of this age was obliged to conclude the capitulation of Cloſter-Seven, by which thirty-eight thouſand Hanoverians laid down their arms. The public, even at that time, was ſo juſt to his Royal Highneſs, as never once to ſuſpect that this capitulation was rendered neceſſary by his con-

conduct, or that it was adopted by his choice. The people of England were equally juſt to his majeſty; but they lamented his unfortunate ſituation. As being the common father of Hanoverians as of Britons, he could not withdraw his attention from the intereſts and ſafety of the former; and nothing is more certain than that the Hanoverian regency did prefer a ſafe ſubjection to France, to the precarious protection of her own elector. This option was a matter which our miniſtry of both parties did not think proper to touch upon; and it perhaps gave the venerable monarch more concealed pain than any incident of his reign had ever done. But, fortunately for him, the injuſtice of France relieved him; an injuſtice ſo barefaced that it has neither in itſelf, nor its conſequences, a precedent in hiſtory.

The regency of Hanover having ſtipulated for themſelves a kind of a feodal neutrality, for I know no other term by which I can call it, would very willingly have pocketed up all the diſgraces and affronts offered to themſelves for a quiet harmleſs enjoyment of their eſtates and properties. Unhappily two difficulties occurred to them. The firſt was the in-

dignities offered to their ſovereign, and the ſecond the groſs oppreſſions inflicted on their fellow ſubjects, in direct contravention of the capitulation. His majeſty, the late king, could not without the moſt ſenſible concern, ſee his Hanoverian ſubjects rendered hewers of wood and drawers of water, not to mention the unjuſt terms which France attempted to impoſe upon the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel and the duke of Brunſwick-Wolfenbuttle. Thoſe indignities rouſed his late majeſty into a generous reſentment and deteſtation of the perfidy and tyranny of France; and from motives of mere humanity to his ſubjects, as well as of juſtice to himſelf, he ordered his Hanoverian army again to be put in motion; and in ſo doing he had the concurrence of the Britiſh parliament and the Britiſh nation.

In the late hiſtorical memorial publiſhed by the court of France, this affair is moſt ſcandalouſly miſrepreſented. His Royal Highneſs, the duke of Cumberland, in the very firſt memorial that was delivered to the count de Lynar, his Daniſh majeſty's miniſter, under whoſe mediation the treaty of Cloſter-Seven was ſigned, informed that miniſter "that his view was to procure by means of that convention a

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ſuſpenſion of arms on both ſides, as the firſt means of a reconciliation." The baron de Schwegeld, on the tenth of September 1757, the very day on which that convention was ſigned, expreſſed the ſame idea to baron de Bernſtorff, the Daniſh miniſter of ſtate; and baron de Steinberg, another of his late majeſty's miniſters, as elector of Hanover, at the court of Vienna, wrote on the twenty-eighth of September to the count de Lynar, the mediating miniſter. "The promiſe of the king, (ſays the Hanoverian miniſter,) the duke of Brunſwick, and the landgrave of Heſſe, not to employ their troops during the preſent troubles, muſt be founded upon the hopes, that in conſideration thereof their ſtates ſhall be delivered from the oppreſſion under which they at preſent groan, and that no pretences ſhall be made to put off this condition till a general peace, which a ſeries of unforeſeen events, of which the preſent year has furniſhed ſo great a number, may long prevent."

I have mentioned thoſe letters which were publiſhed by authority for two reaſons: my firſt is, to ſet the conduct of his late majeſty and his r—l h——ſs in a juſt light, ſince it is plain that the treaty of Cloſter-Seven, was on their part no other

than a negociation *ad interim*, and no formal treaty by which his majeſty's electoral dominions were to remain in the hands of the enemy till a future, and perhaps a very diſtant, reconciliation of the two ſovereigns ſhould take place. Had the ſame been a formal treaty, or had it been underſtood to be ſo, either by his majeſty or his r—l h——ſs, a formal ratification by his majeſty in perſon of the ſame muſt have followed, which his majeſty never thought proper to agree to. My other reaſon for mentioning thoſe letters is, becauſe I think they are ſufficient evidences to prove that the whole of the convention of Cloſter-Seven was of H——n original, and cooked up by his majeſty's electoral miniſters, to procure a temporary ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, and to ſecure their own eſtates from plunder. The goodneſs of his majeſty's heart, and his being at a great diſtance from the ſcenes of action, made him give ear to the applications of the Hanoverian regency and miniſtry; and the convention of Cloſter-Seven was concluded. But in that convention there was no ſtipulation, as the French afterwards wickedly and ridiculouſly pretended, for the diſarming the Heſſian and Wolfenbuttle troops; and it was underſtood that his majeſty's elec-

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toral dominions were to be free from all military executions; and the convention was to continue only till the courts of Vienna and Verſailles had accepted of, or rejected, the propoſals for a definitive treaty. His late majeſty had ſoon reaſon, from the conduct of the court of France, which endeavoured to add to the terms of the convention concluded under the Daniſh mediation, the moſt ſhameful and cruel ſtipulations, that he had been impoſed upon by his H——n miniſtry. The king of Pruſſia was certainly of the ſame opinion, and extremely diſſatisfied with the ſituation of the H——n army after the battle of Haſtenbeck. "Had that army, (ſaid the Berlin gazette,) marched directly to the Leine, and then taken poſt on the other ſide of Wolfenbuttle, Halberſtadt, and Magdebourg, it might have waited ſecurely under the cannon of the latter place, for the junction of the Pruſſian forces; inſtead of which, it turned off to the Lower Weſer, retiring ſucceſſively from Hamelen to Nyenburgh, Verden, Rotenburg, Boxtelhude, and laſtly to Stade, where, for want of ſubſiſtence and elbow-room, the troops were all made *priſoners of war at large*. They made a march of one hundred and fifty miles, to get themſelves

cooped up in a nook, inſtead of taking the other rout, which was only about one hundred miles, and would have led them to a place of ſafety." I ſhall make no obſervation upon this ſevere remonſtrance; becauſe a public writer is not authoriſed to ſay that the whole of this march was privately directed by the influence which the H———n miniſtry had at the c—t of L—n.

The injuſtice, however, and let me add, the egregious folly of the French miniſters, delivered his late majeſty from the moſt diſagreeable ſituation he perhaps ever was in. They even proteſted againſt the validity of the convention, and refuſed to accept of his Daniſh majeſty's guaranty, unleſs the H——n troops ſhould take a ſolemn oath not to ſerve, during the war, againſt France or her allies; and Richelieu, the new hungry French General, inſiſted upon thoſe conditions in the letter he wrote to Zaſtrow, the Hanoverian general, who commanded thoſe troops after his r—l h——ſs's arrival at London that ſame year. Not contented with that, one of thoſe vultures called French financiers, by name Jean Faidy, obtained from the court of Verſailles an actual farm of the territories of his Britannic Majeſty which were

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conquered, or to be conquered. And the ſaid Jean, or John, Faidy actually erected a booth under the direction of one Gautier, another financier, his ſubſtitute, for that purpoſe, in the city of Hanover. This was not the only ſtrain of French injuſtice inflicted on the unhappy electorate. His majeſty's ſubjects there were reduced to a ſtate equally diſtreſſed and diſgraceful. His troops were confined to a ſpot of ground, where, had they continued longer, they muſt have periſhed for want of the common neceſſaries of life. His palaces, and thoſe of his miniſters, were threatned with immediate deſtruction, if the new terms impoſed by France were not inſtantly complied with; and a thouſand other violations of the convention of Cloſter-Seven were committed, each of them ſufficient to induce his majeſty to conſider the validity of it as no longer exiſting. Notwithſtanding all thoſe provocations, ſo delicate was his late majeſty in point of good faith, that after prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick was appointed to the command of the Hanoverian army, and ordered to put it again into motion, that prince on the twenty-eighth of November gave Richelieu, in a letter from Stade, fair warning of what he was about. His Britannic majeſty

jeſty, about the ſame time, ordered a paper to be publiſhed in Germany, entitled, "A previous detail of the motives which induced his majeſty the king of Great-Britain, in quality of elector of Brunſwick Lunebourg, to take up arms againſt the army of France, which is again in motion." Accordingly on the twenty-third of January 1758, the Britiſh parliament granted, *nemine contradicente*, one hundred thouſand pounds for a preſent ſupply in the then critical exigency, towards enabling his majeſty to ſubſiſt and keep together the army formed laſt year in his electoral dominions, and then again put into motion, and actually employed againſt the common enemy, in concert with the king of Pruſſia.

From what is ſaid above, the falſhood of the fact charged in the French hiſtorical memorial, as if the chief pretence made uſe of on the part of the king of Great Britain for breaking the convention of Cloſter-Seven, was, "That the army which had capitulated belonged to the elector; and that the ſame army, which, contrary to the right of nations and all military laws, re-entered into action, was from that time to be conſidered as a Britiſh army:" This allegation, I ſay, from what

what has been obſerved, is falſe in fact. His majeſty was juſtified by the anterior infractions of the capitulation on the part of France; nor had we, at the time that his majeſty's German army was put into motion, taken either the Heſſians or Hanoverians, Wolfenbuttlers, or Saxe-Gotha troops into our pay. The hundred thouſand pounds, already mentioned to have been granted, was not voted, as we have ſeen, till the 23d of January 1758; and the firſt vote, relating to the Heſſian troops, did not paſs till February the 23d thereafter.

Having ſaid thus much, I am ſenſible of the tenderneſs with which the Hanoverian miniſtry ought to be treated; and that it was very natural for them to endeavour, by the beſt means they could, to mitigate their miſeries of war: but the ſame argument holds as good to Britons as to Hanoverians. The latter ſeem'd to have been ſo much convinced of the inutility of all their endeavours to ſave their electorate, that they appear'd chiefly ſolicitous, that his late majeſty ſhould be deprived of the means of making an effectual oppoſition againſt the power of France there. For this purpoſe they perſuaded one of our moſt powerful German allies, I mean the

duke of Brunſwick-Wolfenbuttel, to negotiate, even before the convention of Cloſter-Seven, a convention with France. It is true, this convention was not ſigned by the Brunſwick miniſter till ten days after the convention of Cloſter-Seven was ſigned; but it is equally true, that it was ſigned at Vienna; and that ten days time was too ſhort to have negotiated from Brunſwick to Paris, and from Paris to Vienna. We are likewiſe to obſerve, that in the letter, written by the ſame duke to his brother prince Ferdinand, dated November 27, 1737, he expreſsly ſays, that he had accepted of the convention of Cloſter-Seven on the word of the Hanoverian miniſtry, and that he had, in CONFORMITY TO THEIR INSTURCTIONS, negotiated at Verſailles and Vienna. If this was the caſe, if the defence of Hanover was given up by that miniſtry themſelves, was the Britiſh miniſtry to undertake it at an expence, the moſt monſtrous that any war we ever were engaged in, coſt?

If our good faith, as I think it does, obliges us to aſſiſt our allies in Germany, it ought to be by thoſe means that providence has put into our power. Had not his Pruſſian majeſty's unexpected victory at Roſbach favoured his Britannic ma-

jeſty's ſpirit in ordering his German army to re-aſſemble, it would not have been in our power to have taken the part we have done in the war; and yet all is inſufficient; though the ſufferings of our troops have been as unparallell'd, as the aſſiſtance we have given has been generous. The ſituation of Francfort, that had been treacherouſly ſeized by the French, gave them advantages that all our courage and efforts could not counterballance. It made them maſters of the Mayne and the Rhine, ſecured their communication with the Auſtrian and Imperial armies; and, at the ſame time, opened their way for receiving what reinforcements and proviſions they pleaſed. The neceſſity of diſlodging them from that important poſt was apparent; and as ſoon as the ſeaſon permitted, in the year 1758, prince Ferdinand the Britiſh general, for ſo we muſt now deem him, undertook that arduous taſk at the head of thirty thouſand men. By this time, the vaſt reputation the Britiſh troops had acquired had entitled them to the poſt of honour, which was moſt complaiſantly allowed to them by that general. Accordingly the hereditary prince of Brunſwick put himſelf at the head of the flower of the Britiſh troops, led them through ways

that till then were deemed impaſſible by an army; and, after defeating the French wherever he came, he obliged the duke de Broglio to take a ſtrong poſt at Bergen, between Francfort and Hanau, where prince Ferdinand reſolved to attack him. I ſhall not here enquire, though the enquiry perhaps would not be impertinent, whether his ſerene highneſs, had he been at the head of German troops only, would have thought proper to have made that attack, conſidering the almoſt impregnable ſituation of the French. The attack, however, was made by the Britiſh troops; and perhaps none but Britiſh troops could have been led on to ſo deſperate a ſervice. Nothing of moment was done but by them; and all the loſs which the Germans ſuffered, was in the diſpoſitions made by their general for covering his retreat, and thereby ſaving his army and himſelf from irretrievable deſtruction; even *that* he could not have effected, had it not been by the valour and the farther expence of Britiſh blood. This unſucceſsful attempt loſt to his Britannic majeſty's arms all the glorious conſequences we had promiſed to ourſelves. The progreſs of the French became more rapid than ever. Prince Ferdinand could ſcarcely maintain himſelf

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upon the defenſive; and the French muſt have wintered in Hanover, had not the almoſt miraculous battle of Minden interpoſed.

The reader will be pleaſed here to recollect, that we were, at this time, carrying on the whole war at the expence of near eleven millions a year; of which about three millions went to Heſſians and Hanoverians and for his Pruſſian majeſty's ſubſidy. Beſides this immenſe ſum, we were paying above twenty thouſand of our own troops; and many officers of great fortune in our army there, cut deeply into their private eſtates, in ſupporting themſelves and their fellow officers, whoſe pay, though greater than that of any troops in the world, was inſufficient to relieve them under the inexpreſſible hardſhips they ſuffered. Of all this money, ſcarce a ſhilling of it came back to England; Dutch, Jewiſh, and German contractors were the only gainers; and even the miſerable inhabitants of the country could not be ſaid to have been benefited by it.

In the middle of the year 1759, the French extended their incurſions to the very gates of Hanover, made themſelves maſters of Ritberg, Lipſtadt, and Minden; and it was with difficulty, that prince

Ferdinand

Ferdinand preſerved his communication with the Weſer. At laſt, about the 25th of July, they took Munſter, and in it four thouſand troops. Thoſe were conqueſts, that, conſidering the ſtate of the war, and the great intereſt the Hanoverians had at ſtake, did not indicate any fierce ſpirit of averſion in them once more to ſubmit to French government, eſpecially as they had prince Ferdinand's army in the field, which was rendered in a manner inactive, by the rapid ſucceſſes of the enemy, and the ſurrender of that electorate's ſtrongeſt barrier. At laſt the day arrived that was to deliver his majeſty's electoral dominions. But by whom were they delivered? not by German, but by Britiſh, valour. A few Hanoverians, indeed, by accident, as it would ſeem, ſeconded the irreſiſtible impetuoſity of the Engliſh infantry; but the reſt of the Germans, in the battle which is properly called that of Minden or Thornhauſen, acted as unconcerned ſpectators. Though I am far from vindicating the backwardneſs of the Britiſh general, in not bringing up his cavalry that day, yet it is certain, that, in the admirable defence he made upon his trial, he proved, paſt all contradiction, that the battle was won, both againſt the diſpoſitions and the ex-

pectations

pectations of the German general; and the account publiſhed by the French themſelves intimated the ſame. Another fact is paſt all doubt; that though the day on which the battle of Minden was fought, was to decide the fate of Hanover and of Heſſe-Caſſel, yet two thirds of thoſe who were killed and wounded in this diſciſive action were Britiſh ſoldiers.

Before I proceed in my review of the dreadful conſequences of continuing our troops in Germany, I muſt mention one circumſtance of the utmoſt importance to the welfare and honour of our army ſerving in Germany; and that is the unfortunate ſituation they are in, by the Britiſh general ſerving under the command of a foreigner. I call this an unfortunate ſituation, becauſe, could it have been remedied, it would have been ſo, by his late or preſent majeſty. Gentlemen of the law are the beſt judges whether the unfortunate commander, who was tried and cenſured for his conduct at the battle of Minden, could have regularly refuſed to be tried for diſobedience to the orders of a general, who, by the laws of England, was not duly qualified to command him. I have heard many gentlemen of great knowledge and probity in law, give their opinion in the affirma-

affirmative ; and I never heard the negative advanced by any, but thoſe who think that a royal commiſſion conveys every kind of power, civil as well as military ; men who do not reflect that our martial law itſelf has no exiſtence, but in the authority of our municipal law. For my own part, I ſhould have been extremely glad if this material point had been tried and decided previous to the trial of the right honourable perſon ; and that the conſciouſneſs of his own innocence had not prepoſterouſly made him demand a trial, the event of which probably would have fixed, at the head of Britiſh troops, a Britiſh commander in chief, who, without being laviſh of their blood, would have conſulted their glory. But the opportunity is now loſt, perhaps never to be retrieved, becauſe of the precedent that has been introduced.

As the people of England are equally affected by the diſtreſſes as by the ſucceſſes of ſovereigns, the ſupplies granted by parliament for the ſupport of the German war during 1759, though immenſe, were exceeded by thoſe granted for the ſervice of the year 1760. In order to enable us to ſupply that war with men as well as money, our militia had been embodied. New recruits all over the kingdom, in

Scot-

Scotland eſpecially, were raiſed. An additional body of Heſſians, conſiſting of nine hundred and twenty horſe, and ſix thouſand ſeventy-two foot, was taken into our pay. The treaty between his majeſty and the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, was renewed the 9th of November, 1759, (though it had been concluded no farther back than the 19th of January preceding;) and in conſequence of the ſeparate articles of that treaty, the ſum of ſixty thouſand pounds was, in a manner, made a preſent of to his ſerene highneſs. On the 17th of January, 1760, no leſs than half a million of money was granted by parliament upon account, as a preſent ſupply towards defraying the charges of forage, bread, bread-waggons, train of artillery, and of proviſions, wood, ſtraw, &c. and other extraordinary expences and contingencies, of his majeſty's combined army under the command of Prince Ferdinand; a new and a heavy expence, into which our continental connections have brought us. On the 11th of February following, thirty-four thouſand three hundred and thirty-three pounds was granted for defraying the charge of an augmentation of one thouſand one hundred light cavalry, the troops of Hanover, in the pay of

Great-Britain. That ſame day, the ſum of twenty thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-ſix pounds was granted for defraying the charge of an augmentation of four ſquadrons of hunters and huſſars, the troops of the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, in the pay of Great-Britain. The next vote, on the ſame day, granted the ſum of fifty-two thouſand nine hundred and two pounds, for defraying the charge of an augmentation of five battalions to the king's army in Germany; each battalion conſiſting of one troop of one hundred and one men, and four companies of foot of one hundred and twenty-five men in each company, with a corps of artillery. Thus, in one day, was voted the annual additional ſum (fractions included) of one hundred eight thouſand and twelve pounds, twelve ſhillings, and ſeven pence. But this was not all the expence. That of the militia in England and the new raiſed men in Scotland, was now more than doubled. On the 28th of April, two hundred and ſixty thouſand one hundred and four thouſand pounds was granted for defraying the charge of the embodied militia in England, and of the ſenſible men of Argyleſhire, and lord Sutherland's battalion of Highlanders in North-Britain. That ſame day, thirty thouſand ſeven

hundred

hundred and twenty-two pounds was granted upon account, for defraying the charge of cloathing the embodied militia for 1760.

It may be here objected, that the charge of the militia and the Scotch battalions, ought not to be placed to our German account; but a ſhort anſwer lies to this objection, viz. that had it not been for our maintaining, at an exorbitant expence, twenty-five thouſand of our beſt troops in Germany, there would have been no occaſion to have rendered our militia, to all intents and purpoſes, regular troops, of embodying them, of harraſſing them by marches and counter-marches, of putting their officers to extravagant expences, of bringing both them and their men under military law, and of leaving the lands of England in danger of being both uncultivated and depopulated.

About the time thoſe votes paſſed, our government as well as our people, were ſeized with a moſt ridiculous notion, which the French court had artfully propagated, in order to rouſe the generoſity and benevolence of their own ſubjects, that their king and their government were bankrupt. This notion, which effectually anſwered the purpoſes of his moſt chriſtian majeſty,

was countenanced by the publication of ſeveral authentic pieces in France, by the example of many of her great men, who were not in the ſecret, and of ſome who were in it, who ſent their plate to the mint, and their money to the treaſury; and the public of Great-Britain was, at this time, impreſſed with a firm opinion, that the king and queen of France had no more plate for their table, than a ſingle ſalt-ſeller and a ſingle ſpoon, which, like boys in a boarding-ſchool after dinner, they carefully wiped and put into their pockets. The whole doctrine in our court, parliament, city, and country was, that the French was in the laſt agonies of their credit; and that a very few more vigorous ſteps in Germany would infallibly ruin it paſt recovery.

This doctrine appeared ſo plauſible, that, on the 29th of April, 1760, the ſum of ſixty-ſix thouſand nine hundred and twenty-ſix pounds was granted by parliament for defraying the charge of nine hundred and fifty-nine cavalry, and one thouſand four hundred and fifty-four infantry, the troops of the reigning duke of Brunſwick, in the pay of Great-Britain, purſuant to treaty; and that ſame day, the ſum of twenty-three thouſand eight hun-

dred and forty-three pounds was granted for defraying the charge of an augmentation to the troops of the reigning duke of Brunſwick, in the pay of Great-Britain, purſuant to an ulterior convention, concluded and ſigned at Paderborn, the 5th of March, 1760. The next reſolution which paſſed, was for granting the ſum of one hundred one thouſand and ninety-ſix pounds, for defraying the charge of two additional ſquadrons of huſſars, and two companies of chaſſeurs, together with an augmentation to the horſe, dragoons, and foot, the troops of the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, in the pay of Great-Britain, for 1760. Thus, in one day, of the ſame parliament was granted, in another addition to the expences of the German war, (fractions included) the ſum of ſix hundred eleven thouſand nine hundred and eighty-five pounds, thirteen ſhillings, and one penny halfpenny: ſo that, excluſive of the additional charge of the militia, of a vote of credit of one million, and many other charges, incurred on account of our German connections, the whole additional ſum the German war coſt us in 1760, amounted to ſeven hundred nineteen thouſand nine hundred and ninety-eight pounds, five ſhillings, and eight pence halfpenny.

This

This ſum added to our former, what I may call our ſtanding, expences, amounts to above three millions a year. We are now to conſider what we reaped after the battle of Minden, to compenſate for this treaſure and the Britiſh blood, which now fertilized the uncomfortable plains of Germany.

The campaign of 1759 had been as unfavourable to his Pruſſian majeſty as it was glorious for us till the 11th of September, when the caſtle of Marpurg fell into our hands. By this time we had driven the enemy two hundred and fifty miles before us in Germany, without being poſſeſſed of a ſingle advantage there which we had not at the opening of the campaign; and which we loſt by the ill ſucceſs of our unaccountable attack at Bergen. In fact, we were in a worſe condition; for the Hanoverian general Imhoff did not retake Munſter; and our German general did little more than attempt that ſiege, when he abandoned it. Though the public, from the diſtreſſes of the main body of the French, who had loſt upwards of twenty thouſand men, at and after the battle of Minden, by the valour and intrepidity of the Britiſh troops (for by reading the news-papers and gazettes, we can ſcarcely find that any

other

other were employed in actions of enterprize and danger) were in the moſt ſanguine expectations that our German general would have detached part of his army to the aſſiſtance of his Pruſſian majeſty; and though it is ſaid the latter expected and requeſted it in the moſt earneſt manner, he being now in a moſt dangerous ſituation from the reſpective poſitions of the Auſtrians, Imperialiſts, Ruſſians and Swedes, yet no ſuch meaſure took place; though the junction was far from being impracticable, or even hazardous. This omiſſion could not be owing, as was given out, though moſt falſely, to any diſagreement, either amongſt, or with, the Britiſh generals in the councils of war. They were, moſt of them, men of eſtates or eaſy fortunes; and thoſe, if any, who were not, were enabled to live in their own country comfortably upon their pay. THEY, therefore, could have no reaſon for protracting the war. OTHERS, whoſe *trade* as well as *profeſſion* is war, might have reaſon for continuing a little longer in *buſineſs*; and therefore, ſo far as the public has been acquainted, ſuch a reinforcement never was ſent; though, had it been ſent, it is more than probable it would have put an end to the war and to the effuſion of Britiſh

blood;

blood; for little elſe was ſhed in that army. The conſequence was, that the Ruſſians drew near to the banks of the Oder, and Dohna, though now his Pruſſian majeſty's favourite general, durſt not attack them. Wedel, whom his Pruſſian majeſty thought a more enterpriſing general, took Dohna's command; and though he made a moſt deſperate attack upon the Ruſſians, yet he was repulſed and obliged to repaſs the Oder; and then the Ruſſians made themſelves maſters of Francfort upon that river, and of Croſſen, and count Daun found means to reinforce the Ruſſians with twelve thouſand horſe and eight thouſand foot under the Auſtrian general Laudohn, which made their army very near one hundred thouſand ſtrong, and enabled them to beat his Pruſſian majeſty at Cunnerſdorf, where he loſt more men than he had done in any one action during his former campaigns: for his killed, priſoners, and wounded, amounted to twenty thouſand men. As it is not my deſign to enter farther into the hiſtory of his Pruſſian majeſty's diſtreſſes or ſucceſſes than as they are connected with thoſe of the Britiſh army in Germany, I ſhall now, to make uſe of military terms, obſerve the motions of the latter.

The

The ſtate of the Britiſh army, after the glorious things they had done in the year 1759, in Germany, can afford the reader no other than the moſt diſagreeable ideas. The deliverers of Hanover were obliged to take up ſuch winter quarters as the meaneſt fiſherman's boy upon the Thames could not have put up with; and before they could open the campaign of the year 1760, their cavalry was ruined by mere want of food and forage; while the French troops, by commanding the Mayne, the Moſelle, and the Rhine, had all proviſions in plenty. When both armies took the field, nothing but a miſunderſtanding between the two French generals, Broglio, and St. Germain, could have ſaved the Britiſh troops from deſtruction; but this difference being removed, the allied army was obliged to retire towards the Dymel. It was, at this time, that the hereditary prince formed the glorious project of atttacking the French at Corbach; and here the valour of our German allies proved more conſpicuous than ever. The attack proved unſucceſsful; and through the cowardice of the German horſe and foot, who fled out of the field, the French bade fair to exterminate our army. Already a great body of their cavalry, aſſiſted by a

numerous train of artillery, had begun the work, when the hereditary prince, in this deſperate ſituation, put himſelf at the head of Howard's and Bland's dragoons, whoſe horſes, by this time, had been recruited at a vaſt expence, and not only ſtopt the purſuit of the enemies cavalry, but drove them back to their poſts, and ſecured the retreat of the fugitives to their main army.

An action ſo ſpirited, ſo fortunate, and ſo glorious, gave the young active prince a higher opinion of the Britiſh fidelity and valour, than he had reaſon to conceive of the German; and having formed the bold deſign of relieving Ziegenhagen, he choſe Elliot's dragoons as his chief dependence for ſucceſs. It is true he had with him at the ſame time ſix battalions of German troops, two brigades of hunters, and a regiment of huſſars. But, by the event, they ſeem to have been led to the field rather for parade than uſe. Before they came up to the enemy, which was not till after a march of ſixty miles, the Germans could do no more than juſt break a ſmall party of the French troops; and, in doing that, they pretended to be ſo fatigued as to be unfit for farther action. By the courage, however, of Elliot's dragoons, who, by the bye, had never been in a field of battle be-

before, he obtained the moſt glorious victory the allies could boaſt of, excepting that of Minden, ſince the commencement of the war. It may be here aſked, how was the German cavalry of hunters and huſſars employed during the action? All I can anſwer to this queſtion is a fact, which is, that no more than eight Germans fell in the whole engagement, while the brave Britiſh regiment was almoſt ruined by their own ſucceſſes, and by conquering for others.

I can give little or no reaſon for our German general in chief's inactivity at Saxenhauſen, during, and after the glorious expedition of the hereditary prince to Corbach. It is certain that his ſituation was far from being ſo deſperate as it was when the Britiſh infantry gained him the battle of Minden; but it is likely that the credit gained by our countrymen, at that battle, made him cautious of his employing their cavalry in the battle of Warburg, againſt the chevalier de Muy, which he was in hopes of carrying by his Germans alone. The Engliſh cavalry, at that action, was left five miles behind; but their generals and they had too much ſpirit to remain inactive. Though the former commander of the Britiſh troops had, in the

defence he made upon his trial alledged, that riding about half, or at moſt three quarters of a mile at a full trot, (which ſeems to have been admitted of by ſome general officers who ſate judges on the trial,) muſt have blown their horſes, and have rendered them unfit for action; yet the new Britiſh General, and he who was next in command, advanced with their cavalry, as is ſaid, without orders, to have a ſhare in the glory of this action. They marched the five miles upon ſomewhat that was more than a full trot, came up without any inconveniency or diſorder, to engage their enemies, who upon this charge fell back. The Britiſh infantry and artillery made the ſame noble efforts. Some of them under the hereditary prince had gained conſiderable advantages over the flank and rear of the French, which had already turned the ſcale of victory in favour of the Germans, and the reſt were ſo eager to engage, that many of them dropt down dead, in their endeavours to paſs moraſſes and defiles, to come at their enemy, and rendered the victory deciſive.

But that was not a glory reſerved for Britiſh troops. Deciſion in war is formidable to a general in chief who fights for PAY. The generous efforts of the Britiſh troops

troops came too late; and they only had the glory, as uſual, of loſing ſuch a number of men, that the German general was aſhamed to publiſh the number he loſt in the engagement. Nothing is more certain than that, if the detachment under the chevalier de Muy had, at that time, been ruined, there muſt have been an end of the war; but ſo far from that, though by the valour of the Engliſh, the advantage lay plainly on the ſide of the allies, yet by our German general keeping his camp at Kalle, he loſt all the landgraviate of Heſſe, with Gottingen and Munden, in the electorate of Hanover, and even expoſed his majeſty's German capital to the ſame fate.

Thoſe unaccountable events, after what was boaſted of as being a victory, created prodigious uneaſineſs in Great Britain. It was plain, that wherever the Britiſh troops had been engaged, they had been victorious; that not a ſingle advantage, during the whole campaign, had been gained but by the Britiſh army; and yet like the man who died of good ſymptoms, our affairs in Germany were daily going from one ruin to another. I ſhall not here advance for certain, what has been more than inſinuated, that in all the warlike deliberations there, the Britiſh generals were

always

always outvoted in every meaſure but that of having the preference of themſelves and their troops being knocked on the head, which, in the terms of the military vulgar, is commonly called the poſt of honour.

Be this as it will, a great many Engliſh-men of plain, and therefore ſtrong, ſenſe, began to open their eyes, after the battle of Warburg. They ſaw that they had been deceived by the ſum total, through their inattention to items; that they had, upon plauſible pretexts, been led from ſtep to ſtep; and, like the dupes of the alchemiſt, made to believe that the projection was juſt at hand, when the whole proceſs was ready to blow into the air. Great numbers of the moſt ſanguine votaries for continental connections began now to be cured of their propenſities. They perceived that Mr. Face, the undertaking alchemiſt, had gulled them of prodigious ſums of money, under pretext that the projection every moment was to be expected; but, to ſpeak the moſt favourably, they were yet very diſtant from the deſired hour. The former profeſſions, however, of their operator, remained ſo ſtrong upon their minds, that their complaints ſeldom went farther than doubts, or at moſt growlings; and next year it was held to be an

undoubted fact, that all matters would be juſt as we could wiſh them.

The reader may perceive, that in all I have ſaid, I have confined myſelf entirely to the dreadful ſituation of our ſuffering countrymen in Germany, for whoſe deliverance this addreſs is intended, without regard to any other object. I have not endeavoured to diſpute the very diſputable merits of our miniſters, as to the conqueſts we have made in America and other parts of the globe. I readily admit thoſe conqueſts to be great and important; but I think, at the ſame time, that their greatneſs and importance are the ſtrongeſt arguments to prove, that we ought, before now, to have given up the German war. It is extremely plain, from the original papers publiſhed by France in her hiſtorical memorial, that during the laſt negociation for peace, France offered us both in Europe, Africa, and America, a thouſand times more than we could have had the confidence to have aſked at the commencement of the war. Were thoſe conceſſions owing to our German conqueſts? No, they were owing to conqueſts in thoſe parts of the globe, and on that element, where, under providence, we were ſure we could conquer. Let us ſuppoſe that a

tenth

tenth part of the blood and treaſure we have expended in Germany, had been employed againſt the remaining poſſeſſions of France in America and the Weſt Indies; and, (which is no unreaſonable ſuppoſition) that we had ſucceeded, can a doubt be entertained that the French would in ſuch a caſe have enlarged their conceſſions, by granting all that we aſk for, nay more than what the ultimatum of our miniſter contains?

Let us, on the other hand, ſuppoſe we had carried our original point in Germany, which profeſſedly was no other than to protect Hanover, which ſeems now ready to ſink under the French arms, could that have induced France to have ceded to us a ſingle foot of land in any quarter of the globe, more than what ſhe has offered to do by her ultimatum? No: that I may keep to the words of my firſt propoſition, the protection of Hanover was but a ſecondary meaſure, incidental to the main cauſe of quarrel between the two crowns; and whatever ſucceſs the Britiſh arms have had, or could have had there, it never could have influenced France to have given up one ſingle fort or foot of land that lay within the compaſs of our primary quarrel.

After

After the deviation from the anti-continental ſyſtem had variouſly affected the people of this iſland, conqueſt and ſucceſs reconciled the inconſiſtency, and drew a veil over the ſerious reflections of the public. But, at the ſame time, anti-continental maxims and profeſſions were ſo recent, that ſome apology ſeemed to be neceſſary to certain people who ſtill preſumed to judge for themſelves, by making uſe of their own ſenſes. This apology was neither more nor leſs than, that, by fighting the French in Germany, we, in fact, fought them in America; becauſe the armies they were obliged to ſend there, would have been employed in America. But unfortunately this was the very reverſe of the doctrine with which our m—r ſet out, when he ſaw the neceſſity of either parting with his power, or aboliſhing ſome part of his anti-continental ſyſtem. The language then was: Now that the intereſts of Great-Britain, ſo far as concerns her American poſſeſſions, are ſecured, let us obſerve the terms of good faith, by aſſiſting our allies in Germany. But how, in the name of common ſenſe, are we to aſſiſt them? By ſending twenty-five thouſand men to be butchered, or to rot there? But thoſe men kept a French army in Germany, which

might have been employed in America; ſo that the ſecondary object becomes the ſame, or at leaſt of as much importance as the primary one.

This way of reaſoning, had it been made uſe of in the beginning of the war, when the anti-continental ſyſtem was in full bloom, and before its bloſſoms had fallen off, might have been very unpopular; but ſtill it might have carried with it ſome ſhadow of reaſon. But it happened, that the more diſabled the French were to tranſport a ſingle battalion to any part of the globe, the more did we multiply our force in Germany. France, at the beginning of the war, had no deſpicable marine, and it might have been poſſible, (though not very probable, as appears by what actually happened in the caſe of the Lys and Alcyde,) that, if ſhe had been in luck, ſhe might have found means to have thrown over two or three regiments to North-America. It will however puzzle the greateſt latitudinarian in hiſtory and politics, to prove that it was, even at that time, in the power of France to have thrown over into North America a European force numerous enough to have baffled our expeditions againſt her colonies. During the progreſs of the war this difficulty

culty increaſed; and at laſt, by the deſtruction of her marine it became unſurmountable, and has continued ſo for theſe two years; and yet, during that time our connections in Germany have been ſtronger, and our army more numerous than ever.

Thus the advocates for connecting the continental war with the primary cauſes of our differences with France, ſpeak the very language of our enemies. "The hoſtilities, (ſay they in their hiſtorical memorial) in Weſtphalia and Lower Saxony, have had and ſtill have the ſame object as the hoſtilities in America, Aſia, and Africa; that is to ſay, the diſputes ſubſiſting between the two crowns concerning the limits of Acadia and Canada." But this is a groſs miſrepreſentation of the fact, and evidently ariſes from the advocates for a German war, joining ſo far with the French miniſtry as to confound the political character of a king of Great Britain with that of the elector of Hanover, though they are ſeparated, by every principle of this conſtitution, with the greateſt care and preciſion. His late majeſty himſelf was ſo ſenſible of this, that in the famous, but now forgotten, paper publiſhed by his authority in the year 1757, or the beginning of the year 1758, entitled "The king of Eng-

land's conduct as elector of Hanover," he makes a clear distinction between the two capacities; for in that paper he says, that "None but such as are unacquainted with the maritime force of England, can believe that, without a diversion on the continent, to employ part of the enemies force, she is not in a condition to hope for success, and maintain her superiority at sea. England had therefore no interest to foment quarrels or wars in Europe." In another passage of the same paper, the same distinction is more clearly expressed. "The king, (says the author,) defrayed the expences of the campaign of 1757, at his own proper charge; and, except the payment which the Hessian troops received from England, that crown contributed only two hundred thousand pound sterling to that campaign; a sum which, it is easy to see, was sufficient but for a small part of the necessary expences. Had it been in the power of the king to shun this war, the Hanoverian troops would have stood in no need of subsidies."

The reader is here to observe, that when the above paper was published, the war was above eighteen months old; and that France herself has been just as inconsistent on this head, as some have been

nearer

nearer home. For when the empreſs queen began her operations againſt Pruſſia, ſhe prevailed upon the court of France, as appears by a paper, publiſhed by authority of his moſt chriſtian majeſty, to offer a neutrality for Hanover, during all the time the war ſhould continue between France and Great-Britain. This was a plain ſeparation of the two capacities of king and elector; and as things have ſince turned out, it had been happy for this nation had that neutrality been accepted of, notwithſtanding the diſadvantageous terms attending it. France, it is plain, neither had nor could have any motives for attacking Hanover, but on account of our American differences; and thus has ſhe connected the cauſe of the king with that of the elector. But, by this paper it is evident ſhe waves that plea which, upon the neutrality being rejected, ſhe was, in a manner, obliged to reſume. It is true, one of the conditions of this neutrality, viz. the fourth, requires the ELECTOR not to aſſiſt either directly or indirectly the king of Pruſſia or his allies, either with men or money. But this article, if the courts of Vienna and Verſailles are not the moſt egregious blunderers in point of ſtyle ever heard of, does not bind up the king of

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England from ſupplying his Pruſſian majeſty both with men and money. The ſixth article requires the town of Hamelen to be depoſited into the hands of the empreſs queen; but then it was to be reſtored at the end of the war, in the ſame condition as it was received; and by the eleventh article, the empreſs of Ruſſia and the king of Denmark, were to be required to guaranty the convention. This, undoubtedly, was an article hard of digeſtion; but had it been complied with, it might have ſaved that electorate from many diſagreeable viciſſitudes which it has ſince experienced.

I have been the more full upon the ſubject of this neutrality, which was proffered ſo early as the fourth of January, 1757, becauſe it plainly ſhews, that we were at firſt no other than volunteers in the ſervice of Hanover. For, on the twenty-firſt of February thereafter, our parliament voted the two hundred thouſand pounds, above mentioned, from the paper called "The king of England's reaſons" for aſſiſting his majeſty to form an army of obſervation in Germany, whoſe operations, as we have already ſeen, terminated in the convention of Cloſter-Seven. From this detail, I ſhall not take the advantage, which I am fairly entitled

entitled to, of attempting to prove, that our connections with Hanover were not originally entitled even to the epithet of *ſecondary* to our intereſts in America; becauſe, it is plain, that it was in our power, ſuppoſing thoſe conditions to have been laid before our miniſtry, which I cannot doubt of, to have carried on the American war, independently of all conſiderations but thoſe of fulfilling our treaty with the king of Pruſſia, concluded at London in January 1756. But it is to be obſerved, at the ſame time, that this treaty was defenſive, and that the offenſive ſteps which his Pruſſian majeſty took afterwards, I do not ſay in conſequence of this treaty, were diſavowed by his Britannic majeſty in his quality of elector; becauſe they furniſhed France with a pretext of throwing upon the treaty of London, concluded in January 1756, the odium of kindling the war in Germany.

This leads me, before I finiſh what I have to advance in ſupport of my firſt propoſition, to a moſt important conſideration, which is, that the members of the Germanic empire, appear evidently to have been of opinion with the court of France; and that the invaſion of Saxony was an actual breach of the tranquility of the

empire,

empire, by their having furniſhed his imperial majeſty with their contingencies for forming what is called "the army of the empire". This is the more remarkable, as thoſe princes ſeem very accurately and very wiſely to diſtinguiſh between the regard that ought to be paid to the Germanic conſtitution, and the caution they ought to obſerve for circumſcribing the unbounded ambition of the houſe of Auſtria. The proteſtant princes of the empire, the Mecklenburg family in particular, as well as the popiſh, had the ſame views in this particular. The ſucceſſes of Pruſſia could not intimidate them, and the intrigues of the aulic council could not win them over. The ſame principle that made them condemn his Pruſſian majeſty for the invaſion of Saxony, led them to oppoſe the annihilating his Pruſſian majeſty, ſo far as to ſuffer him to be put to the ban of the empire. They did, indeed, declare him a public enemy, but they did not think a breach of the peace amounted to high treaſon. The friends of the Hanover family, viz. the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, and the dukes of Brunſwick and Saxe-Gotha, oppoſed the reſolutions taken againſt him in the diet of Ratiſbon; and the reaſons why they did ſo does not re-

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quire to be pointed out. But that diet could not be brought to go farther lengths againſt him; and conſidering the vaſt influence, which ever ſince the peace of Weſtphalia, the French have had over that body, there is the ſtrongeſt reaſon for believing that the court of Verſailles was of their opinion, and ſecretly traverſed the intrigues of the court of Vienna.

I call the above a moſt important conſideration, becauſe, had we ſufficiently attended to it, it would have rid us from all our engagements, to keep an army of Engliſhmen in Germany on account of his Pruſſian majeſty's concerns; and in fact, the conduct of the diet tended to bring the Germanic conſtitution back to its firſt principles, which they thought had been violated by the irruption into Saxony. The private evidence his Pruſſian majeſty had, which, by the bye, never was authenticated till he had got poſſeſſion of Dreſden, was no object of the diet's conſideration; and they, perhaps, very properly, judged of the facts which they *did* ſee, and not of the motives which they *could not* ſee. It is extremely remarkable, that this reſolution of the diet againſt his Pruſſian majeſty did not take place till the 17th of January, 1757,

when it was publicly known not only in England but all over Europe, (and I believe even notified to ſome courts,) that an army of obſervation was forming in the empire; for the reſolution of the Britiſh parliament to grant his majeſty two hundred thouſand pounds, to enable him to form that army, paſſed on the 21ſt of February following.

Let us now, upon the whole, ſee how the affairs of Germany, with regard to Great-Britain, ſtood at that momentous period; and whether Hanover was in ſuch diſtreſs, the king of Pruſſia in ſuch danger, and the proteſtant religion under ſuch calamity, as to induce us to plunge, as we did, into the continental ſyſtem, and to ſpend twenty millions of money in, or upon, Germany.

That his Britannic majeſty did not think Hanover in diſtreſs is evident; becauſe, on the fourth of January, before he had rejected the neutrality for that electorate under a moſt unexceptionable guaranty, ſuppoſing he had accepted of that guaranty, what muſt have been the conſequences? Very probably, that the king of Pruſſia would have abandoned his expeditions againſt Saxony and Bohemia, which his Britannic majeſty ſeemed to

condemn, and in which it was never pretended Great Britain had, or could have, the leaſt concern or intereſt. Had that deſirable event taken place, the army of the empire never could have been brought to the field.

Trojaque nunc ſtares, Priamique arx alta maneres.

Pruſſia never had been loſt to the Ruſſians, nor Hanover to the French. The faireſt dominions of the houſe of Brandenburg would not have been in poſſeſſion of the houſe of Auſtria, its declared enemy; and had the empire ſtood neutral, as in ſuch an event it certainly would have done, the two empreſſes never durſt have puſhed their arms againſt his Pruſſian majeſty. *Sed, quorſum hæc,* to what does all this tend? My anſwer is, that the criſis, far as we have gone into connental meaſures, and unfortunate (for ſo I muſt think) as we are, is not now irretrievable by the wiſdom and ſteadineſs of a Britiſh parliament, as I ſhall prove in the ſubſequent pages, becauſe it is the principal object of this addreſs.

It is true, had Hanover accepted the proferred neutrality, his Pruſſian majeſty muſt have been deprived of the harveſt of the laurels, and the thorns he has ſince

reaped; but could that have affected Great-Britain? As to the proteſtant religion, the guardians of it in Germany did not think it to be in danger; nor do I remember that his late majeſty, or the king of Pruſſia, ever *ſeriouſly* declared that it *was*; nor to this day has the public any reaſon to apprehend that it *is*.

Having thus diſcuſſed my firſt, and by far my moſt important propoſition, the reader may perhaps think that I have proved too much, and that our war in Germany is rather *foreign* than *ſecondary*, to the quarrel between Great-Britain and France. How far it originally might have been *foreign*, the reader from what has been ſaid, may judge for himſelf; but I muſt be of opinion, that *progreſſively*, it became ſubordinate. I ſhall now proceed to my ſecond propoſition, which is,

"That when Great-Britain had ſecured the main object ſhe had in view, in making war, her intereſt led her to have recalled her troops from the continent."

The chief queſtion to be diſcuſſed under this propoſition, is, whether in fact Great-Britain has ſecured the main object for which ſhe went to war with France? The warmeſt advocate for continental meaſures muſt, I apprehend, allow that *prima-*

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rily, neither the preſervation of Hanover, nor the houſe of Brandenburg, were our main objects, and, at the ſame time, he muſt admit, that the retrieving and ſecuring our American poſſeſſions, were the profeſſed cauſes of the war. I know not, however, by what fatality it has happened, that in our late negotiation with France, (if we are to believe the French memorial on that ſubject) in the very firſt conference our miniſter at Paris had with the French miniſtry, he declared that his maſter would ſupport his allies with *efficacy* and *good faith*. Tho' I have perhaps a worſe opinion than many have of French *good faith*, and not ſo high an opinion as others may entertain of French *good ſenſe*; yet I cannot help ſurmizing with them, that this language in ſo early a period of the negotiation carried with it an air, as if our ſupporting our allies in Germany had been at *that time our primary* object. That it has become a *primary* object with us, I am ſorry to ſay, after the obſervations I have already made on the ſubject.

But as I intend theſe pages to prevent *future*, rather than blame *paſt*, miſcarriages (for ſuch, I cannot help thinking have mingled with our continental meaſures). I ſhall confine myſelf to the preſent mo-

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ment, and prove, I hope, to the ſatisfaction of the reader, that it is not even yet too late to retrieve any erring connections, which we have formed during the progreſs of the war, to divert our attention from what ought to be our *primary* object.

Very little reaſoning will ſuffice for this purpoſe. *Happily* for us, our connections with his Pruſſian majeſty are only *annual*; but *unhappily* for us, they have been *annually* renewed with an article of mutuality, which ties us up from making peace, but with his conſent. This article, which, if I miſtake not, is the fourth, in our ſubſidiary treaty with that monarch, does, I moſt candidly acknowledge, make the performance of it a *primary* conſideration in the preſent war; and our miniſter at Paris very properly inſiſted upon our performing it. I apprehend, however, that at the expiration of the year, from the date of the treaty, it is void. Let us therefore ſuppoſe it to be void, what muſt the effect be? The ruin of the king of Pruſſia? It is againſt common ſenſe to think ſo. Let us *continue* his ſubſidy, for to that I have no manner of objection; but let us not *continue* to be under his direction, or to receive laws in obtemperance to his conveniency. It is not the intereſt of Great-Britain, to ſecond

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the ambition of any power upon the continent. To preſerve that balance to which ambition is an enemy, is all ſhe ought to aim at.

But how can ſhe do that? Not by continuing her troops in Germany; but by recalling them. Their continuance there ſerves but to heighten his Pruſſian majeſty's diſtreſs, and may in the end accelerate his ruin. I ſhall not anſwer for the ſecret views, or principles, of the court of Vienna; but I think it evident beyond all contradiction, that were our army recalled from Germany, his Pruſſian majeſty muſt be in a much better ſituation than he is in at preſent. My reaſon is, becauſe the court of Vienna, tho' backed by the reſolutions of the Aulic (that is, its own) council, have never yet been able to perſuade the diet of Ratiſbon, to put him to the ban of the empire. From thence we may fairly infer, that his co-powers in the empire, bear againſt him neither envy or malice in their hearts, and that all they wiſh for, is, that he may be a little leſs turbulent.

Here it may be ſaid, for I ſhall put all objections againſt me in the ſtrongeſt light, Great-Britain has guarantied to his Pruſſian majeſty the poſſeſſion of Sileſia; and if ſhe does not aſſiſt him, the Empreſs

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queen, by far the moſt conſiderable power in the empire, will take it from him. I admit this to be a melancholy conſideration; but can Great-Britain help it? She herſelf had the poſſeſſion of Port Mahon guarantied to her by almoſt all the powers in Europe. But to what guaranty is ſhe to appeal now that ſhe has loſt it? Should the Spaniards beſiege Gibraltar to-morrow; is there a power in Europe who guaranties our poſſeſſion of that important fortreſs, that would not laugh in our face, ſhould we apply to her for fulfilling the terms of her guaranty? But I am far from thinking, whatever other courts do, that Great-Britain ought to be deficient in *good faith*. Let her fulfil her guaranty by ſupplying his Pruſſian majeſty even with heaped meaſure, that is, let us *continue* our ſubſidy to him, till we ſee what turn affairs will take. Suppoſing the moſt unfavourable turn, and that his Pruſſian majeſty is ſtript of Sileſia; does the fate of Great-Britain depend upon that? No, we had an exiſtence, we had credit, we had power, we had a conſtitution, before the houſe of Brandenburg came into poſſeſſion of that territory. I will take upon me to ſay, that we once looked upon his Pruſſian majeſty's acquiſition of it, to be an over-weakening of the

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houſe of Auſtria, and of prejudice to the balance of power in Europe. I ſhall not even diſſemble my apprehenſions, that his Pruſſian majeſty may loſe Sileſia. But can our continuing our troops in their ſlaughter-houſes hinder that event from taking place? I am afraid it will forward it, and that their remaining in Germany has forwarded it too much already; but I muſt be of opinion, that the inſtant the Empreſs queen is reinſtated in the poſſeſſion of Sileſia, the former and the natural ſyſtem of Europe will take place. France will become the protector of Pruſſia, Great-Britain will be his friend, and the princes of the Empire, perhaps, the houſe of Auſtria itſelf will join in reſtoring him to all the importance he had in the Empire before he acquired Sileſia.

What I have ſaid, with regard to his Pruſſian majeſty, holds in a great meaſure true, as to Hanover, if we admit that our engagements with that Electorate has rendered it a *primary* object in the preſent war. It is idle, it is againſt common ſenſe, to imagine that France, (and no other power is at war with it) were ſhe at this very time poſſeſſed of Hanover, could be able to keep it for ſix months, without expending ten times more than the whole

electorate is worth. Were I to ſpeak my own ſentiments, I would ſay that the great misfortunes of the Hanoverians have proceed from their having had Britiſh troops for their defenders; becauſe it is a defence of ſuch a nature, as ſpreads either indifference or jealouſy through the princes of the empire, whoſe natural intereſt leads them to wiſh his Britannic majeſty to be the peaceable poſſeſſor of his own electorate.

From what I have ſaid, I muſt conclude, that either our aſſiſting the king of Pruſſia, or defending Hanover, were not our *primary* objects in our war with France; or, if they were, that they were miſtaken ones, and ought to be conſidered as ſuch for the future. Having premiſed this, the reader needs but to throw his eye upon the *ultimatum* of France, to be convinced, that Great-Britain has more than ſecured the main object ſhe had in view, in making war, which was the retrieving and ſecuring her American poſſeſſions. I, therefore, proceed to my third propoſition, which is,

"That ſhe might have recalled her troops from Germany, and yet have adhered ſtrictly to her engagements with her allies there, and have been enabled to have ſerved them more effectually than ſhe has done

done by the uſeleſs reſidence of her troops in that uncomfortable country, for theſe twenty months paſt."

I am free enough to own, that when I ſketched out the plan of this addreſs, I did not imagine that I ſhould have been obliged to have anticipated, under the heads of my firſt and ſecond propoſitions, ſo much matter as is applicable to this. Somewhat, however, ſtill remains to be obſerved. It is certain, that his late majeſty rejected the neutrality of Hanover, only becauſe of the harſh terms impoſed upon him, by granting Hamelen for a place of arms, and a free paſſage, or what the German Civilians call a *Tranſitus Innoxius*, through his electoral dominions to the troops of the empreſs-queen, and her allies. If the reader is acquainted with the hiſtory of that time, he muſt be ſenſible that had the neutrality been properly modified, his majeſty would have accepted of it; and I believe the modifications he required are producible. I mention this only to prove, that our agreeing to a *proper* neutrality for Hanover could have been no breach of our engagements with our allies in Germany. But whether ſuch a neutrality ſhall be entered into or not, even ſuppoſing us, againſt all probability,

to be able to obtain it, does by no means affect the preſent queſtion. We were under no engagements but thoſe of honour and gratitude, to ſend our troops to that more than inhoſpitable country. We are under no engagements to continue them, where their abode is only fatal to themſelves. Had we been able to deliver that electorate, our aſſiſtance muſt juſtly have been deemed magnanimous, nay virtuous; but the extreme of every virtue becomes a vice. Magnanimity in a deſperate cauſe is nó other than Quixotiſm; and liberality in reclaiming what is irretrievable, prodigality in the higheſt degree. Let us, in the name of *good faith*, fulfil our engagements, both with his Pruſſian majeſty and with Hanover; but let us not, in the name of *humanity*, extend them a ſingle moment beyond that which determines them. Are we to imagine, becauſe we do not hear the groans, perhaps the reproaches, of our ſtarving, ſlaughtered, expiring countrymen, in Weſtphalia, that none ſuch are vented? Becauſe, perhaps by the rigid rules of war and politics, the complaints of the ſurvivors do not come to our ears; becauſe the military law does not even admit of ſuch complaints being either publiſhed in the camp, or tranſpiring into the public, can

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we imagine they do not exiſt? if they are ſuppreſt by authority, they claim our animadverſion; if through modeſty, our compaſſion. That there is foundation for ſuch complaints is undeniable; nor does it claim the leaſt conſideration to anſwer the ſuggeſtions that the French, the Pruſſians, Hanoverians, Heſſians, Ruſſians, and other foreign troops, ſerving in Germany, undergo the ſame hardſhips. Perhaps they do: but the ſtate of a German, a French, or a Ruſſian ſoldier, in ſummer or winter, in camp or out of camp, is almoſt the ſame; they have but a little addition of miſery. Add to this argument, that they are enduring that miſery in their own quarrel. Very different is their ſituation from that of Britiſh ſubjects under the ſame circumſtances. This country, with her freedom, purchaſed opulence to all her natives; and their ſubjection to the hardſhips they ſuffer is embittered by the reflection, which I am afraid is but too common amongſt them, that they are ſuffering in a foreign quarrel. Their preſent ſituation is perhaps the firſt inſtance in hiſtory of ſo numerous a Britiſh army ſerving in a foreign country, without being able to command the common neceſſaries of life. In another reſpect, they are

ſtill more unfortunate, becauſe, for ſome time paſt, they have been dead to fame, to themſelves, and to their country.

I am ſenſible the battle of Fellinghauſen may be objected to this aſſertion; but what was that battle, even according to the German accounts? The French general conſidered his german opponents as being in a manner below his notice; and our German General had taken care that the Britiſh troops ſhould be poſted without the line of his encampment. This was more than the French generals, Soubiſe and Broglio durſt have hoped for; and therefore they bent the whole of their force againſt the Britiſh army. Their motions and intentions were known to the meaneſt ſoldier in the camp, who ſaw lord Granby's advanced poſts diſlodged without a ſingle German ſent to ſupport them; and all the comfort the Britiſh troops had, was an order to their general, from the German general, his ſuperior, to maintain his ground to the laſt extremity, The brave Britiſh troops did ſo: but not a ſingle mention is made (in the German account of the battle) of their amazing intrepidity againſt ſuch a diſparity of numbers between them and their aſſailants. From the plan of the battle, it appears very plain,

that the marquis of Granby was poſted between the rivers Lippe and Aeſt; and that for about eight hours, he ſuſtained a moſt dreadful attack from marſhal Broglio at the head of the flower of the French army. Two ſmall detachments at laſt, one under general Wutgenau on his left, and another under the prince of Anhalt, on his right, were ſent to ſupport him; but not till after the French had been repulſed, through incredible efforts of courage, by the Britiſh troops. It will perhaps puzzle the ableſt miltary connoiſſeur in Europe, to account for the reaſon, why lieutenant-general Conway, who was at the head of eight battalions and ſeven ſquadrons, Britiſh troops, was not ſent to ſupport his brave countrymen, under the marquis of Granby; and why he was obliged to lie inactive on the heights of Rinderin, with the Aeſt on his left, as if our German general had been afraid of making the victory too deciſive. Since that day, viz. the 16th of July, 1761, the Britiſh troops in Germany have ſcarcely been heard of; and matters have been ſo managed, that the victory they gained at Fellinghauſen was but a prelude to the triumph of the French over Hanover. Little more, I think, needs to be ſaid, to

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eſtabliſh my third propoſition, which, in fact, is too ſelf-evident to admit of diſpute. I therefore proceed to my fourth :

" That Great Britain has now no object of ſufficient importance to detain her troops in Germany."

Five and twenty thouſand Engliſhmen were formerly thought ſufficient to conquer all France : and that number, excepting thoſe that the ſword or ſickneſs have deſtroyed, is now rotting by peace-meal in the wilds of Germany. I ſhall admit Hanover to be a proper object for their operations ; but from the courſe of the campaign, I can by no manner of means ſee, that the defence of that electorate has directly employed our German general. It appears, on the contrary, that the French at any time were welcome to walk into Hanover, and that the door was open for them ; at leaſt, ſuch was the ſituation of affairs, when the battle of Fellinghauſen was fought. The diſagreeable events which, ſince that time, have happened to his Pruſſian majeſty, render the ſituation of our brave countrymen in Germany more and more uncomfortable. Againſt what object can they advance ? The progreſs of the French in Hanover has rendered their valour uſeleſs ; and our German

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general ſeems to remember the prodigious things they did in the plains of Minden, only to put him upon his guard againſt giving them another opportunity of diſplaying the ſame valour.

I am almoſt aſhamed to inſiſt longer on a propoſition ſo evident in itſelf, and yet ſo reproachful to others. Where is the man, (to uſe the words of a late ſpeech,) who will ſtep forward to *guide?* to *guide* our troops to victory, or, what is almoſt the ſame, to battle? Where is the man, who can declare for what purpoſe they are now detained in Germany? And if the progreſs of the French ſhould continue ſo as to make themſelves maſters of Stade, where is the man who will inſure their return to England, as freemen, Britons, and ſoldiers?

Here I ſhould willingly reſt the merit of this memorial, were it not that a great authorty in point of fact may be urged againſt me, and that is, no leſs than the conduct of a late great miniſter, who rather than admit even the propoſal, or any thing that looked like a propoſal, of abandoning our allies on the continent, treated the French miniſter in a manner that no gentleman would have borne from another, by ſending him back the memorial relative to the king of Pruſſia, as implying an attempt upon the

honour of Great-Britain. National honour undoubtedly ought to be ſacred; but I can by no means ſee, as his Pruſſian majeſty, as well as the allies of France, conſented that a ſeparate peace ſhould be treated of between France and Great-Britain, that our recalling our troops from the continent could, in any reſpect, operate to our diſhonour, or to his prejudice. It is paſt all doubt, that if we ſent our army to protect Hanover, the end is as unattainable as the meaſure was miſtaken. If we ſent them to aſſiſt the king of Pruſſia, their errand was ſtill more abſurd, unleſs we could have locked the French out of Germany. But be this as it will, tho' the *honour* of the nation is concerned in her fulfilling her engagements, after they are formed, yet her *wiſdom* calls upon her to be cautious in forming them. I ſhall admit that while our treaty with Pruſſia ſubſiſted, by which we obliged ourſelves not to make peace but with his conſent, it would have been diſhonourable to have broken that engagement, or to have failed in fulfilling the other articles of the ſame treaty. But we are under no manner of obligation, either in honour or juſtice, to renew that treaty, after the term of it is expired.

Great-Britain has made efforts in favour of

of her allies, that after-ages will ſcarcely credit. She has even attempted impoſſibilities to ſerve and to ſatisfy them, that nothing in her power ſhould be wanting for their deliverance. She has been ſo far from ſucceeding, that her aſſiſtance, inſtead of relieving, has diſtreſſed her friends; and in fact, ſhe may be ſaid to have been, all this while, fighting, for fighting ſake. France, ſo far as regards the German war, is in the ſame abſurd ſituation, but ſeems to be ſenſible of it. She, in fact, tells the Britiſh court, that the French and the Engliſh in Germany are cutting one another's throats in other people's quarrels, and without doing their friends the leaſt ſervice; and that by withdrawing the weight of their reſpective troops from thence, the ſtate of the war between his Pruſſian majeſty, and the two empreſſes, can receive no manner of alteration; according to the poet,

Now Europe's balanc'd, neither ſide prevails,
For nothing's left in either of the ſcales.

This offer from France, of withdrawing from the war in Germany, is the ſtrongeſt confirmation of what I have already ſaid, that it is not underſtood either by France herſelf, or by the diet of the empire, that ſhe ſhould keep poſſeſſion of Hanover, or

that it is even worth her while to attempt it. Therefore, without doing any thing to impair the national honour, I own I cannot help wiſhing, that our great miniſter had been a little more tractable on this head than he was, and that he would have tried to have got ſome mitigation of the *means*, as the *end* was ſo deſirable. I have no idea, that France, in earneſt, deſires or intends, that the king of Pruſſia ſhould be ruined; on the contrary, it is her apparent intereſt to prevent his ruin. Might not our miniſter have felt the pulſe of that court, in trying how far ſhe would agree to our continuing a pecuniary aſſiſtance to that monarch. It is true, that in the definitive propoſitions delivered to Mr. Stanley from the court of Great-Britain, the ſeventh article requires France to make a general evacuation of all her conqueſts, and the ſeventh article of the ultimatum of France, in anſwer to thoſe propoſals, agrees, that the landgraviate of Heſſe Caſſel, the dutchy of Brunſwick, and the electorate of Hanover, ſhall be evacuated of French troops; but the French add to the ſame article, that they have no power to reſtore Weſel, or the conqueſts held by the Empreſs queen. The ſtate of the queſtion, therefore, is very plain, and very ſhort, as follows:

lows: Whether we ought to conſent to his Pruſſian majeſty being deprived, in the mean while, of a country that brings him in about 20,000l. a year, (for the yearly revenues of Weſel and Guelders, which the French took for the Empreſs queen, are not eſtimated above 100,000 crowns,) or we ſhould continue to ſpend yearly about ſix or ſeven millions, and throw away 8 or 10,000 lives in a war, that can be of no manner of ſervice either to ourſelves or our allies?

Can ſuch an option admit of one moment's heſitation, eſpecially as the matter was to have undergone a future diſcuſſion in the congreſs of Augsbourg. While I ſay this, I am far from juſtifying the demands of the French in behalf of their ally the empreſs queen; and it is more than probable, that, in their hearts, they condemn her obſtinacy, as much as we, or his Pruſſian majeſty, do. Btt what does that avail, as neither we nor they can better ourſelves? As the common proverb ſays, *we are to make the beſt of a bad bargain*, and that we have a *bad bargain* is certain to too melancholy a degree. Can any man doubt, which condition it would be preferable for us to have? our brave countrymen doing duty in this kingdom,

or in Germany, where, inſtead of being of any manner of ſervice, either to themſelves, or our allies, they only awake the jealouſy, and confirm the obſtinacy, of other powers. There is not a prince in Europe, our German generals excepted, who can be benefited thro' their abode there, nor can any honeſt man reap the leaſt advantage by it.

It is with great pain I muſt obſerve, that the manner of wording the intelligence we have had of our army in Germany, ever ſince they had the misfortune to go thither, has been generally ſo perplexed, ſo dark, and ſometimes ſo enigmatical, that we have all along known little or nothing of their ſituation or operations. To day we find them encamped near a village, never before known to Britiſh ears; to-morrow they are marching through wilds, never before trod by human foot; and, the third day, they emerge upon ſome bleak uncomfortable height for the benefit of the freſh air. It is true, that while a march or meaſure is in agitation, it is very proper to conceal the particulars from the public. But I think the people of Great Britain, who have even with romantic magnanimity ſupported this war, have ſome right, after the operations are over,

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to be made acquainted with the motives that influenced them. They ought, at leaſt, to be ſatisfied, that our German general does not expoſe them to unneceſſary fatigues; that he does not lead them into *wanton* danger; that he does not render them *food for that powder*, of which, alas! they have been the voluntary objects. Can any man alive take into his hand the gazettes, that preceded the firſt of Auguſt, 1759, and ſay, that the victory of Minden was obtained in conſequence of our German general's diſpoſitions? and that his deliverance was not owing to the moſt amazing exertion of Britiſh courage, that her hiſtory can produce? It is true, that after the valour of our countrymen had broken through the toils that the French had ſpread around them, ten thouſand beauties were found in his *manœuvres*, as they are called, and every motion, which really was effected by *chance*, was then cried up as being planned by *judgment*.

But are we to tire out providence, (for the victory of Minden was the moſt providential one ever known)? Shall we continue, like Sir Martin Mar-all, to make motions on the flute after the muſic is ceaſed? or what is ſtill worſe, are

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we to be ſtill amuſed with idle German paragraphs, till we are brought into a ſituation, worſe than that of the *Farcæ Condinæ* of the Romans, by the enemy cutting off the communication of our army with Stade, and with any ſea-ports, by which they have a chance of *eſcaping* to their own country. Theſe conſiderations are the more important, as the complexion of the war in Germany is, at preſent, much more unfavourable, both for us and his Pruſſian majeſty, than it was on the fifth of Auguſt laſt. If we are to compare the accounts of our gazette with facts, it will appear that, like the man who died of good ſymptoms, our army is now languiſhing, even iu a mortal ſtate, after having been victorious through the whole of this year, and never once having received a misfortune. They have not had even the poor comfort of purchaſing miſery by glory. They have been doomed to the inſipid manœuvres, directed by thoſe whoſe intereſt it is to protract the war, three times beyond the duration of that of Troy.

Though I am far from impeaching the good intentions of the right honourable gentleman, who recanted his opinion of continental connections, by making it the

ſacrifice which *folly and prepoſſeſſion offered to wiſdom and experience*; yet, though I do not *condemn* his conduct, I muſt at the ſame time acknowledge, that I do not *underſtand* it; and I think ſome meaſures have paſſed under his adminiſtration, that no miniſter need to boaſt of having *guided*. When the ſtake for which his Pruſſian majeſty plays upon the continent, and which he has to loſe, is compared to the expence of Great Britain there, it is about a ſhilling to fifty pounds; and yet Great Britain, to win that ſhilling, is at three times the charge he is at, that he may ſave his fifty pounds. But that is not all; we furniſh him with money to ſtake on his part. Should he gain, not a ſhilling of it ever can come back to us; becauſe he is under no obligation to refund a farthing. If he ſhould even not only ſave his own, but win from others, by the help of our money, we are not intitled to a farthing of indemnification. It is true, it may be pretended, that the treaty between Great-Britain and Pruſſia is only defenſive; but it is as true, that his Pruſſian majeſty was enabled, by that treaty, to conquer Saxony, and invade Bohemia. It is likewiſe certain, that, at the time that treaty was con-

cluded, his Pruſſian majeſty had a prodigious army on foot, and knew that the empreſs-queen intended to attack him with eighty-thouſand men, and the empreſs of Ruſſia with a hundred and twenty thouſand: and that their deſign was to have been executed in the ſpring of the year 1756; only it ſeems the Britiſh money, which we had ſtipulated to pay to the empreſs of Ruſſia, by the treaty of September preceding, did not arrive time enough to put her troops in motion, though it did very ſoon after. This, at leaſt, is what his Pruſſian majeſty pretended, while her imperial royal majeſty, in a counter-declaration ſhe publiſhed, flatly denied that any offenſive alliance had been formed againſt Pruſſia, between her and the empreſs of Ruſſia; neither indeed, as I have hinted before, did the diet of Ratisbon appear ſatisfied, that the diſcoveries his Pruſſian majeſty had made in the cabinet of Dreſden ſufficiently warranted him to invade Saxony and Bohemia; and even his late majeſty, as elector of Hanover, publiſhed his diſapprobation of that invaſion.

So many circumſtances of the powerful confederacy formed againſt his Pruſſian majeſty appearing, we ſhould have naturally

turally thought, that our patriot miniſter could not have given ſo effectual a demonſtration of his patriotiſm, after he came again into power, than by reviewing the ſtate of affairs between Great Britain and Pruſſia, and examining whether any accidental or natural attachment for Hanover had rendered the terms of the treaty concluded between us vaſtly too burdenſome for Great Britain. But this was ſo far from being the caſe, that, though the treaty, during his adminiſtration was again and again renewed, Great Britain never was eaſed of the oppreſſive part of it, I mean that article which binds her up from concluding any ſeparate treaty of peace, but by common advice and conſent, each expreſly including therein the other. When our connections with Pruſſia were firſt formed, the friends of the houſe of Hanover, little imagining what a dreadful alliance had been concluded againſt him, did indeed expreſs ſome apprehenſions, leſt his Pruſſian majeſty, after getting our money, ſhould have made his own terms ; and therefore they thought this mutual ſtipulation was very proper. Undoubtedly it was for Hanover and for Great Britain too, if we conſider their in-

tereſts as being the ſame; but when enemy upon enemy multiplied upon his Pruſſian majeſty; when eighty thouſand Auſtrians, and eighty thouſand Ruſſians, had taken the field againſt him, when the armies of France, of Sweden, and the Empire, were pouring into his dominions; when the wonderful efforts he exerted, and the victories he gained, ſerved only to render his fall the more glorious, but withou bettering his condition, was it prudent, was it patriotical, was it juſt, to link Great-Britain to ſuch an ally, and that in ſuch a manner, as to put it in his power to keep ſuch hold of us, as that, if he ſhould ſink, we muſt go to the bottom with him. If the cauſe of the proteſtant religion, and even ſentiments of humanity, have called upon us, or ſhould further call upon us, to aſſiſt his Pruſſian majeſty, let us do it in ſuch a manner, as to be for his advantge, and not to our own ruin, without being even able to ſerve him, at leaſt, with any efficacy. If we give him money, let him make the beſt uſe of it he can; but let us not trifle with the healths, the liberties, and the lives of five and twenty thouſand of our brave countrymen, who can give him no aſſiſtance.

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But can they aſſiſt Hanover, may, perhaps, be called the great queſtion; and if they can aſſiſt it, ought they not to do it? I ſhould be as ſanguine as any one, in the cauſe of Hanover, if I thought it in any manner of danger, but from *our* attempts to defend it. Nothing, to me, ſeems to be more evident than that, if there was not a ſingle regiment of Britiſh troops in Germany, the French army neither would nor durſt, winter in that electorate. Whoever has traced the operations of this year, upon the maps of Germany, can ſee with half an eye, that the French, ſo far back as the middle of June laſt, had the poſſeſſion of Hanover been the real object of their arms, might have marched almoſt without reſiſtance to that capital. But, in the name of common ſenſe, to what purpoſe could that have ſerved, unleſs they had maſſacred three fourths of the inhabitants, that they might ſucceed to their victuals; for I believe there is no truth more univerſally acknowledged at preſent, than that Hanover is now ſo exhauſted as not to be able to ſubſiſt its own natives; and that every ſhilling of the revenues of its government is actually employed for that purpoſe, and yet all is inſufficient for alleviating its miſeries?

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The French, therefore, have a much more ſenſible object in view than the poſſeſſion of that electorate, where they muſt abſolutely periſh for want of the neceſſaries of life, and that is, their keeping the army and allies of Britain, employed in plans, and upon purpoſes, at an expence no nation can ſupport, without their being able to bring the leaſt advantage, to, what we affect to call, the common-cauſe. Suppoſing our national troops to be inſtantly recalled by his majeſty, could the king of Pruſſia pretend that to be an infraction of our treaty with him? No, ſurely, there is not, in that treaty, a ſingle ſyllable about Britiſh troops, nor any ſtipulation about the matters I have already mentioned, excepting the two following, that his Britannic majeſty ſhould pay his Pruſſian majeſty 670,000l. ſterling, and that his Pruſſian majeſty ſhould employ the ſaid ſum, in keeping up and augmenting his forces, which ſhall act in the moſt advantageous manner for the common cauſe. This I look upon as a fortunate circumſtance for us; nay, as the only fortunate one in all our German connections; and I hope our parliament will conſider it in the ſame light.

If we are to believe the accounts that come

come from our own private officers in Germany, not only their own diſtreſſes are unſpeakable, but the diſtreſſes to which they are obliged to put the miſerable natives, friends, as well as foes, are ſo likewiſe. I I know, at the beginning of every new parliament, and every new ſeſſion of parliament, nothing is more common, than for a party who has a point to carry to propagate rumours, to influence the members to come into their meaſures, eſpecially if ſubſidies are to be raiſed; and I ſcarcely remember a year of Sir Robert Walpole's long adminiſtration, in which the ſeſſion was not uſhered in with ſome dreadful accounts of an invaſion threatened, of troops aſſembling on the coaſts of Britanny, or Galicia, of a rebellion at home, or ſome other impending calamity. The ſame game ſeems now to be going forward; and it is aſſerted with great confidence, that our German general has obtained a conſiderable advantage over the French. Perhaps he has, and very probably he might have his reaſons, for taking ſome vigorous ſteps juſt before our parliament ſate down; but I muſt be of opinion, that he has obtained no deciſive advantage; and that ſhould he beat the French five hundred times, his

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ſucceſſes never can relieve Germany, while our troops continue in it. Succeſs, and even inaction, may defeat, may prolong, the lucrative poſt he enjoys ; but it is recalling our troops alone, that can be of ſervice to Great-Britain.

October, 1935
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Jan Bierow

F I N I S.